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Note 
 
Challenging the Plausibility Standard Under the 
Rules Enabling Act 
Edwin W. Stockmeyer∗
In Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Aschroft v. Iqbal, the Su-
preme Court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, a complaint must be plausible.
  
1 To 
satisfy this plausibility standard, a complaint must plead suffi-
cient facts to permit a reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the alleged misconduct.2 In dissent, Justice John 
Paul Stevens suggested that this standard would disrupt the 
long-standing uniformity between federal and state pleading 
standards.3 Indeed, since Twombly, a number of state courts 
have explicitly rejected or declined to apply the plausibility 
standard.4 As a result, there is an increasing number of con-
flicts between the pleading standards in state and federal 
courts.5
 
∗  J.D. candidate, 2013 University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
the Staff and Board of the Minnesota Law Review for making Volume 97 a 
success. Thank you also to my parents for their constant optimism and sup-
port. Most of all, thank you to Holly for your unyielding love; I owe you every-
thing. Copyright © 2013 by Edwin W. Stockmeyer. 
 This disuniformity will become the object of dispute as 
 1. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).  
 2. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 3. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Taking their 
cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as 
their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority re-
pudiates: whether it appears ‘beyond doubt’ that ‘no set of facts’ in support of 
the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”).  
 4. See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 
S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (“We decline to adopt the new plausibility 
standard and adhere . . . to the notice pleading standard . . . .”); McCurry v. 
Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) (holding that there 
is “no similar basis to fundamentally alter our interpretation of CR 12(b)(6) 
that has been in effect for nearly 50 years and decline to do so here” (citations 
omitted)).  
 5. See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great 
Split Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
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federal district courts, hearing actions based solely on diversity 
of citizenship jurisdiction,6
When faced with conflicting state and federal law in diver-
sity cases, federal courts determine the applicable law accord-
ing to the Erie doctrine which, speaking generally, instructs 
federal courts to apply state “substantive” law but federal rules 
of “procedure.”
 decide whether to apply state or 
federal pleading standards.  
7 However, in the Supreme Court’s most recent 
Erie doctrine decision, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. 
Allstate Insurance Co., the Court issued a fractured opinion 
with a majority of Justices agreeing in the result, but only a 
minority of Justices agreeing on how to interpret the Rules En-
abling Act (REA)—the statute governing the validity of proce-
dural and evidentiary rules in federal courts.8 While Justice 
Antonin Scalia leaves almost no room for state law to apply 
when there is a controlling federal rule,9 Justice Stevens would 
give some deference, albeit limited, to state specific policies en-
gendered in procedural rules.10 Shady Grove’s diverging opin-
ions left unclear the status of federal rules that directly conflict 
with their state counterparts.11
 
109, 109 (“Other states will have to decide the same issue in the months and 
years to come.”). 
 As a result, district courts lack 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).  
 7. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (hold-
ing that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state”); id. at 92 
(Reed, J., concurring) (assuring that “[t]he line between procedural and sub-
stantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure”).  
 8. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431 (2010). Although Shady Grove resulted in a five-to-four majority decision, 
five of the nine Justices explicitly disagreed with plurality opinion’s analysis. 
See id. at 1448–60 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1460–73 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).  
 9. Id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (arguing that “Congress has undoubted 
power to supplant state law, and undoubted power to prescribe rules for the 
courts it has created, so long as those rules regulate matters ‘rationally capa-
ble of classification’ as procedure” (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 
(1965))). 
 10. Id. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that a federal rule “can-
not govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that 
is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but so intertwined with a state 
right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state-created 
right”). 
 11. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the 
Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 25 (2010) (“When 
the dust settled at the end of the [Shady Grove] opinions, little was resolved. 
The proper interpretive approach to the [Rules] Enabling Act remains an open 
question.”). 
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clear guidelines to follow when choosing between such conflict-
ing rules.  
This Note argues that application of the plausibility stand-
ard violates the terms of the REA12
I. PLEADING RULES: DISUNIFORM STANDARDS AND 
POLICIES 
 when it conflicts with a 
more lenient state pleading rule. This Note does not argue for 
or against plausibility or notice pleading generally but simply 
takes vertically disuniform pleading standards as given and 
analyzes that conflict of law within the context of the REA. 
Part I first introduces relevant state and federal pleading 
standards and then proceeds to analyze and highlight their dif-
ferences. Part II introduces the Court’s Erie doctrine jurispru-
dence and the diverging approaches to interpreting the REA 
exhibited in Shady Grove, arguing that Justice Stevens’s inter-
pretation is more accurate than Justice Scalia’s. Part III 
demonstrates that the REA does not “enable” the plausibility 
standard to displace state pleading rules that are sufficiently 
substantive, examines the advantages of this approach, and re-
sponds to potential criticisms. When a state pleading standard 
is more lenient than its federal counterpart, it may operate to 
define the scope of the state’s substantive rights and therefore 
should apply in federal courts. 
A review of both state and federal pleading standards is 
necessary to understand how courts should analyze the validity 
of the plausibility standard in diversity cases. This Part pro-
ceeds in two sections. First, it describes the Court’s develop-
ment of the plausibility standard. Next, it examines how state 
courts have responded to the plausibility standard and the dif-
ferences between standards that have emerged from these re-
assessments.  
A. PLEADING IN FEDERAL COURTS: THE PLAUSIBILITY 
STANDARD 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) first 
took effect in 1938.13 One of the central features of these Feder-
al Rules was the liberal pleading practice they encouraged.14
 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).  
 
 13. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2011) (detailing the history of the 
drafting and enactment of the Federal Rules).  
 14. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play 
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Prior to the Federal Rules, pleading was a technical process 
that often resulted in dismissal due to procedural missteps.15 
However, under the Federal Rules, a complaint is sufficient so 
long as it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”16 For exam-
ple, a complaint of negligence need only state: “On date, at 
place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against 
the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, 
lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and 
incurred expenses of $.”17 Thus, Rule 8(a)(2) only requires that 
the plaintiff give the defendant notice of the plaintiff’s allega-
tions and the grounds for those allegations.18 The general pur-
pose of this liberal requirement is to encourage adjudication 
based on the merits of the facts and evidence, and to avoid 
technicality-based dismissal before those merits have a chance 
to be heard.19
To challenge the legal sufficiency of a complaint, a defend-
ant may file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim up-
on which relief can be granted.”
 
20 When granted, the plaintiff 
generally has a chance to amend the complaint.21
 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2010) (reporting 
that “[g]eneralized pleadings, broad discovery, and limited summary judgment 
became integral, interdependent elements of the pretrial process”).  
  
 15. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1218 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that the distinctions between 
“facts,” “evidence,” and “conclusions” that were the hallmarks of code pleading 
resulted in “traps for the unwary or the inexperienced pleader and tactical ad-
vantages for the adroit pleader that were unrelated to the merits of the par-
ticular case”). 
 16. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. The forms appended to the Federal Rules are 
intended serve as examples of what the rules require. See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 
(“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the sim-
plicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”). 
 18. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that “all the Rules 
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defend-
ant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests”). 
 19. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and 
Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 557–58 (2010) (noting that 
the purpose behind the language choice in Rule 8(a)(2) was “an attempt to cre-
ate a standard that would reach the merits of a dispute rather than one that 
would terminate a plaintiff’s case on technical grounds at the outset”); see also 
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (emphasizing that 
dismissing a case due to pleading insufficiency results in depriving the plain-
tiff “of his day in court”). 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 21. See, e.g., Polich v. Burlington N., Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 
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In two recent cases, the Supreme Court addressed the 
proper standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a 
claim. In Twombly, the Court dismissed a Sherman Act com-
plaint that lacked sufficient facts to show that the defendants’ 
anticompetitive conduct was intentional rather than a product 
of coincidental “independent action.”22 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 
Court dismissed a Bivens action alleging unconstitutional 
treatment based on race because the complaint lacked “any fac-
tual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ dis-
criminatory state of mind.”23
In the process of dismissing these claims, the Court con-
ducted in-depth analyses of the proper pleading practices in 
federal courts, and employed new language, holding that a 
complaint must be “plausible on its face.”
  
24 Emphasizing prece-
dent and commentary, the Court held that a legally sufficient 
complaint must rise above mere speculation of wrongdoing and 
must contain more than a bare “recitation of a cause of action’s 
elements.”25 To meet these requirements the complaint must 
contain enough factual content to “nudge” the claim “across the 
line from conceivable to plausible.”26 This “nudge” takes the 
form of an inference; a claim is plausible when “the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
duct alleged.”27
Between Twombly and Iqbal, two major aspects of pleading 
practices emerge. First, both opinions employ pleading stand-
ards as a method of controlling discovery costs and abuse. Ac-
cording to the Court, the cost of discovery encourages defend-
ants to settle claims, even where the complaint may be 
frivolous.
 
28 And in both cases, the Court rejected the adequacy 
of discovery management techniques as a method of limiting 
such abuses.29
 
1991) (ruling that “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is 
clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment”).  
 The plausibility standard, therefore, is necessary 
 22. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). 
 23. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). 
 24. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 25. Id. at 545. 
 26. Id. at 570. 
 27. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 28. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (worrying that “the threat of discovery 
expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before 
reaching those proceedings”).  
 29. See id. at 559 (arguing that because judicial management of discovery 
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to curb discovery abuses by requiring complaints to meet a 
threshold level of plausibility before granting plaintiffs access 
to discovery procedures.30
Second, the Court established a general framework for as-
sessing the sufficiency of a complaint. First, the court brackets 
any legal conclusions it finds within the complaint.
 
31 Under 
traditional motion-to-dismiss practice, only factual allegations 
are entitled to a presumption of truth when determining the 
sufficiency of a complaint.32 Thus, when assessing a complaint’s 
facial plausibility, a court must first divest it of any conclusory 
content.33 Second, the court proceeds to determine whether 
those facts state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.34 
Under Iqbal, a claim is facially plausible when it provides a 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct.35 This inference is informed by “judicial experience 
and common sense.”36
 
abuse has been “modest,” “[i]t is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a 
plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the 
discovery process through ‘careful case management’”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 
(arguing that deferring discovery for petitioners under the qualified immunity 
doctrine would be fruitless because “it would prove necessary for petitioners 
and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does not de-
velop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position”). 
 Hence, in both Twombly and Iqbal, the 
 30. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (“Probably, then, it is only by taking 
care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we 
can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery [in frivolous 
cases].”). 
 31. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (stating that usual practice of “accept[ing] 
as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 
conclusions” and that “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a 
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions”). 
 32. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 540 (1988) (stating 
that on a motion to dismiss, “we accept all of the factual allegations in peti-
tioners’ complaint as true and ask whether, in these circumstances, dismissal 
of the complaint was appropriate”). 
 33. Precisely what constitutes a fact as opposed to a legal conclusion has 
been the subject of some debate since Iqbal. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14, at 
24–25 (demonstrating that since Iqbal, the conclusion category is being ap-
plied to “allegations that one reasonably might classify as factual”). However, 
this is an old debate, mirroring debates that coincided with the drafting of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, 
‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact’, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 236–46 (1937) (arguing 
the distinction between “statements of fact” and “mere conclusion of law” is 
merely a difference of degree and that such distinctions “can do little more 
than generate doubt and uncertainty and provoke controversy and litigation”). 
 34. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 679. 
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Court dismissed the complaint, in part, because of “more like-
ly,”37 or “obvious alternative”38 explanations.39
The Twombly-Iqbal approach to pleading generated sub-
stantial commentary. Many—though not all—commentators 
read plausibility as a shift in pleading standards.
 If the factual al-
legations provide for an inference of wrong-doing, based on the 
judge’s experience and common sense, the complaint will sur-
vive a motion to dismiss. If, on the other hand, there is no such 
inference, a court will dismiss the complaint. 
40 Accordingly, 
state courts are increasingly asked to decide between “notice” 
and “plausibility” pleading.41
B. STATE COURTS RESPOND TO PLAUSIBILITY 
  
Although some state courts have accepted plausibility as 
the proper standard,42 a majority of state appellate courts have 
either rejected the plausibility standard43
 
 37. Id. at 681. 
 or declined to apply 
 38. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567–68 (2007). 
 39. In Twombly, the Court dismissed the case in large part because there 
were more natural explanations for the service providers’ conduct than anti-
competitive agreements. Specifically, the Court argued that because these 
companies were originally “born” into a world filled with monopolies, the com-
panies were likely more comfortable refraining from competition. See id. Simi-
larly, in Iqbal, the Court argued that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a 
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, inci-
dental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to 
target neither Arabs nor Muslims.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Because this is a 
more “likely” alternative explanation, the Court decided that “discrimination 
is not a plausible conclusion.” See id.  
 40. Compare, e.g., Miller, supra note 14, at 10 (arguing that after 
Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o a significant degree, the liberal-procedure ethos of 
1938 has given way to a restrictive one”), with Bradley Scott Shannon, I Have 
Federal Pleading All Figured Out, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 453, 455 (2010) 
(arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court’s rulings in Twombly and Iqbal probably 
did not result in a significant change in the overall federal-court pleading 
scheme”). 
 41. See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 
S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (“We decline to adopt the new plausibility 
standard and adhere . . . to the notice pleading standard . . . .”). 
 42. See, e.g., Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (Mass. 
2008) (adopting Twombly’s “refinement” of Conley); Doe v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Neb., 788 N.W.2d 264, 277–78 (Neb. 2010) (concluding that 
Twombly “provides a balanced approach for determining whether a complaint 
should survive a motion to dismiss”); Sisney v. Best Inc., 754 N.W.2d 804, 809 
(S.D. 2008) (adopting the plausibility standard). 
 43. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 344, 345 (Ariz. 2008) (re-
jecting Twombly); Century Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hold-
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it.44
1. Rejecting Iqbal’s Fact-Conclusion Dichotomy 
 This Part examines three important themes that have 
emerged from recent decisions in these states. First, some 
states reject Twombly and Iqbal’s strict fact-conclusion dichot-
omy. Second, some state courts consider it improper to apply 
judicial experience and common sense to determine a com-
plaint’s sufficiency. Last, some state courts are not convinced 
that discovery management should be a central policy inform-
ing their pleading doctrines. This discussion concludes that by 
rejecting the plausibility standard, state courts aim to permit 
more plaintiffs to access discovery procedures and have the 
merits of their complaints tested. 
While Iqbal and Twombly require a court to parse through 
each section of a complaint and disregard every conclusion,45 
state courts tend to reject this strict dichotomy. Most dramati-
cally, in West Virginia “a plaintiff is not required to set out 
facts upon which the claim is based.”46
 
ings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 2011) (holding that “the governing pleading 
standard in Delaware . . . is reasonable ‘conceivability’” not plausibility); Haw-
keye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 608 
(Iowa 2012) (rejecting the plausibility standard); Brilz v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 
285 P.3d 494, 500 (Mont. 2012) (holding that determining the sufficiency of a 
complaint under Montana law is “distinct from the issue” of a complaint’s suf-
ficiency under the plausibility standard); Madrid v. Vill. of Chama, 283 P.3d 
871, 876 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (rejecting the plausibility standard); Sacksteder 
v. Senney, No. 24993, 2012 WL 4480695, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012) 
(holding that it was error for the trial court to apply the plausibility standard); 
Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 430 (rejecting the plausibility standard); Colby v. Um-
brella, 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008) (declaring that Vermont courts “are 
in no way bound by federal jurisprudence in interpreting our state pleading 
rules” and affirming Vermont’s “notice pleading” standard); McCurry v. Chevy 
Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) (refusing to adopt the plau-
sibility standard); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 189–90 n.4 (W. 
Va. 2010) (distinguishing between the plausibility standard and West Virgin-
ia’s “fair notice” standard); Syed v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No. 
090467, 2012 WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (rejecting the plau-
sibility standard). 
 Similarly, a number of 
states only require “allegations from which an inference may 
 44. See Crum v. Johns Manville, Inc., 19 So. 3d 208, 212–13 n.2 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2009) (explaining that the plausibility standard does not apply unless the 
Alabama Supreme Court chooses to adopt it); Smith v. State, No. 104775, 2012 
WL 1072756, at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2012) (declining to apply the plau-
sibility standard without authorization from the state legislature or the Su-
preme Court of Kansas). 
 45. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 46. Roth, 700 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan 
Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 516, 522 (W. Va. 1995)). 
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fairly be drawn that evidence on . . . material points will be in-
troduced at trial.”47 Allegations that may be more conclusory 
than factual are, nevertheless, permitted so long as it is fair to 
infer that supporting evidence will be provided in the future. 
Although the Supreme Court of Tennessee acknowledged that a 
court is not required to accept the veracity of so-called conclu-
sions,48 this is not the same as the federal requirement to disre-
gard them.49
2. Excluding Judicial Experience and Common Sense 
 By rejecting the strict fact-conclusion dichotomy, 
these state pleading standards are designed to allow more 
complaints to proceed than would be permitted under the plau-
sibility standard. 
State courts also tend to disavow Iqbal’s plausibility prong. 
While Iqbal requires application of judicial experience and 
common sense50 and requires “more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct,”51 Washington courts simply ask “if it is possible 
that facts could be established to support the allegations in the 
complaint.”52 Similarly, courts in Arizona and Tennessee are 
restricted to “an examination of the pleadings alone.”53
Restricting a court’s analysis to the four corners of the 
pleading also serves to permit more complaints to proceed to 
discovery. Significantly, the McCurry court argued that apply-
 By re-
stricting their pleading standard to the contents of the com-
plaint, these states prohibit the court from weighing external 
considerations such as judicial experience and common sense. 
 
 47. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 427 (quoting Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d 87, 92 
(Tenn. 2004)); see also Cullen, 189 P.3d at 346 (“Courts must also assume the 
truth of the well-pled factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences 
therefrom.”); Smith, 2012 WL 1072756, at *7 (stating that the first task when 
assessing a complaint’s sufficiency is to “accept the facts alleged by the plain-
tiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn there-
from” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 427 (clarifying that “courts are not required to 
accept as true assertions that are merely legal arguments or ‘legal conclu-
sions’”). 
 49. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (asserting that mere 
conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”). 
 50. See id. (describing the process of assessing a claim’s plausibility as in-
volving application of “judicial experience and common sense”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 862 (Wash. 2010) 
(emphasis in original). 
 53. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426; see also Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 
P.3d 344, 346 (Ariz. 2008) (“Arizona courts look only to the pleading itself and 
consider the well-pled factual allegations contained therein.”). 
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ing experience or common sense may result in dismissal of le-
gally sufficient complaints because the judge nevertheless be-
lieves the claim is implausible.54 Whereas federal courts should 
dismiss claims where experience or common sense suggests 
more likely explanations for the defendant’s conduct,55 Tennes-
see and Washington courts consider such determinations inap-
propriate because they are external to the complaint and irrel-
evant to the question of its legal sufficiency. Like their rejection 
of the fact-conclusion dichotomy, these states worry that the 
plausibility standard would narrow the range of complaints 
that could survive a motion to dismiss. These courts emphasize 
that because plausibility looks beyond the complaint itself, that 
standard enhances the risk of denying a remedy despite the 
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.56
3. Deemphasizing Discovery Concerns 
 
Different policy concerns inform state pleading rules than 
those that inform the Federal Rule. Most importantly, while 
Iqbal and Twombly sought to protect defendants from the costs 
associated with unwarranted discovery abuse, many state 
courts remain unconvinced that discovery costs justify a nar-
rower pleading standard.57
 
 54. See McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (arguing that the plausibility standard 
“adds a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial 
judge can dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the 
conduct alleged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the 
claim will ultimately succeed”); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 
197 (W. Va. 2010) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (worrying that applying judicial 
experience and common sense requires “a judge to make a value determina-
tion on the likelihood of whether a claim will ultimately succeed or not before 
meaningful discovery occurs, even if the law provides a remedy for the conduct 
alleged” and observing that a variety across levels of judicial experience may 
create inconsistency). 
 Most notably, the Supreme Court of 
 55. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
 56. McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (observing that the motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim “weeds out complaints where, even if what the plaintiff 
alleges is true, the law does not provide a remedy” and that the plausibility 
standard adds to this “a determination of the likelihood of success on the mer-
its”). 
 57. See Hawkeye Foodservices Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 
N.W.2d 600, 608 (Iowa 2012) (remaining unpersuaded that Iowa courts face 
“systemic” discovery pressures); McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (concluding that 
discovery abuse is not sufficiently prevalent in Washington courts to justify a 
shift in pleading practices); Syed v. Mobile Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No. 
090467, 2012 WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (“[W]e are not 
aware of any evidence demonstrating the presence of rampant discovery abuse 
by plaintiffs in the Commonwealth that would justify adopting the ‘plausibil-
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Tennessee has articulated the policies that broader pleading 
rules pursue. First, the court emphasized the virtue of main-
taining the status quo which “allows individuals to plan their 
affairs and to safely judge of their legal rights.”58 Second, courts 
should emphasize merit-based outcomes over the relative costs 
of that process and should conservatively protect the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.59 Lastly, the court worried that the 
federal standard would limit access to state courts when the 
plaintiff has limited access to the facts necessary to state a 
plausible claim.60
State courts have developed lower standards of pleading 
which reject the notion of plausibility and express a number of 
unique policies. Underlying each of the policies is a single val-
ue: allowing plaintiffs who may not yet have all the facts neces-
sary to support their claim to access discovery procedures ra-
ther than risk terminating a potentially valid claim 
prematurely.
 By emphasizing the rights and policies that 
broader pleading rules protect and deemphasizing discovery 
protections, these state court standards inevitably serve to 
permit more claims to proceed to discovery. 
61
These state opinions rejecting the plausibility standard 
have also created significant disuniformity between state and 
federal pleading standards. Some have projected that as this 
disuniformity evolves, federal courts will be asked with increas-
ing frequency to apply state pleading standards in diversity 
cases.
 This difference between state and federal plead-
ing standards is important for determining the validity of the 
federal plausibility standard under the REA. 
62
 
ity’ standard.”). 
 Indeed, such requests have already emerged on a lim-
 58. Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. See id. at 432 (arguing that the application of judicial experience and 
common sense to weigh a complaint’s facts “conflicts with the strong prefer-
ence . . . that cases stating a valid legal claim brought by Tennessee citizens be 
decided on their merits,” which “raises potential concerns implicating the 
Tennessee [c]onstitutional mandate that the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 60. See id. at 434–35 (listing types of claims which involve “information 
asymmetry” between the parties and worrying that these types of cases are 
particularly vulnerable to pre-discovery dismissal under the plausibility 
standard). 
 61. See, e.g., Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 197 (W. Va. 2010) 
(Benjamin, J., dissenting) (“I believe we must also be weary [sic] of a proce-
dure which could be harsh on pro se litigants or otherwise be viewed as impos-
ing unnecessary hurdles at the courthouse door to the substantial rights of 
parties.”). 
 62. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading 
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ited scale.63
II.  WHEN DO FEDERAL RULES DISPLACE STATE RULES?   
 In order to answer whether a state or federal law 
applies in a diversity case, federal courts look to the Erie doc-
trine. 
To understand how federal courts will treat conflicting 
pleading rules in diversity cases, this Part introduces the mod-
ern Erie doctrine, focusing primarily on the REA and the 
Court’s most recent attempt to interpret it in Shady Grove. Af-
ter introducing the doctrine, this Part highlights the differences 
between Shady Grove’s plurality and concurring opinions and 
argues that Justice Stevens’s opinion presents a more accurate 
textual reading of the REA and is not the radical departure 
from precedent that Justice Scalia paints it to be.  
A. CONFLICTED FEDERAL RULES AND THE REA 
What is commonly referred to as the Erie doctrine, is actu-
ally two distinct lines of case law, one evolving out of Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins64 and the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),65 
and the other evolving out of Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.66 and the 
REA.67 Though both doctrines address vertical conflicts of law, 
each does so in a different context.68
 
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2008) 
(claiming that many states “now face the choice of whether to stand or break 
with Conley notice pleading”); Michalski, supra note 
 When there is a vertical 
5, at 109 (“Other states 
will have to decide the same issue in the months and years to come.”). 
 63. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *20, Seattle Collision Ctr., Inc. v. 
Am. States Ins. Co., 2011 WL 1155275 (No. 10-1189) (arguing that both the 
District Court for the Western District of Washington and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the federal plausibility standard 
instead of the Washington state pleading standard), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
2936 (2011); Brief for Appellants at *10–11, G&S Holdings LLC v. Cont. Cas. 
Co., 2011 WL 4542825 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1813) (arguing that Erie com-
mands the application of a state pleading standard when a case is removed 
from a state court to federal court).  
 64. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states . . . shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States 
. . . .”). 
 66. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (holding that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 35 is valid because it “really regulates proce-
dure”). 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (delegating to the Supreme Court Congress’s 
power to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure” and requiring that 
“[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). 
 68. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–71 (1965) (arguing that the 
Erie doctrine is not the “appropriate test of the validity and therefore the ap-
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conflict created by federal judge-made law, the RDA, as inter-
preted by Erie and other cases, instructs a federal court to ap-
ply state law to the extent that this choice of law minimizes fo-
rum shopping,69 enables equitable administration of the law,70 
and does not disrupt supervening federal interests.71 On the 
other hand, if a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure creates the con-
flict, the REA instructs federal courts to apply that rule unless 
it is not arguably procedural72 or it “abridges, enlarges or modi-
fies any substantive right.”73 To demonstrate how courts should 
answer the question of conflicting pleading rules, this Part fur-
ther introduces the modern REA analysis.74
When a federal procedural rule creates a vertical conflict of 
law, courts determine that rule’s validity according to the REA. 
Pursuant to its constitutional power to create and maintain a 
system of federal courts
 It then examines 
the recent Shady Grove decision and the diverging approaches 
contained therein. 
75
 
plicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure” and that the proper test is “the 
scope of the [Rules] Enabling Act and the constitutionality of specific Federal 
Rules”); see also John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 693, 718 (1974) (arguing that “Hanna’s main point, however, was that 
when the application of a Federal Rule is at issue, the Rules Enabling Act—
and not the Rules of Decision Act as construed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and 
other cases—should determine whether federal or state law is to be applied”). 
 and the Necessary and Proper 
 69. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467–68 (arguing that “choices between state 
and federal law are to be made . . . by reference to the policies underlying the 
Erie rule” and identifying “discouragement of forum-shopping” as one of those 
policies). 
 70. See id. at 468 (identifying “avoidance of inequitable administration of 
the laws” as the other policy “underlying the Erie rule”). 
 71. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 
(1958) (ruling that “the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring jury 
decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the inter-
est of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come out one way 
in the federal court and another way in the state court”). 
 72. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (articulating the constitutional authority 
to create procedural rules as being limited to the “power to regulate matters 
which . . . are rationally capable of classification as either” substantive or pro-
cedural). 
 73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (instructing the Supreme Court not to 
create procedural rules which “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right”). 
 74. Because the Court’s RDA analysis does not apply where there is a con-
trolling rule of federal procedure, and because pleading in federal courts is 
controlled by Rule 8(a)(2), this Note does not further analyze the scope or im-
plications of the RDA. 
 75. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in . . . such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
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Clause,76 Congress enacted the REA, which delegates to the 
Supreme Court the congressional power to prescribe a system 
of procedural and evidentiary rules applicable in all district 
courts.77
The REA’s first clause—“the enabling clause”—gives the 
Supreme Court the power to create procedural rules.
 However, the Supreme Court cannot use this power to 
hide substantive law in a procedural code; all procedural rules 
must abide by both clauses of the REA. 
78 Alt-
hough Congress delegated its rule-making responsibility to the 
Supreme Court, that power remains Congress’s and, therefore, 
no Federal Rule may exceed Congress’s power over procedure.79 
As the Supreme Court has admitted, however, the distinction 
between procedure and substance cannot be maintained con-
sistently.80 Rather than drawing a hard line between procedure 
and substance, the Court has stated that Congress’s power to 
create procedural rules “includes a power to regulate matters 
which, though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
stance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as 
either.”81 In other words, so long as a rule is “rationally capable 
of classification as procedur[al],” it is constitutionally valid and 
does not violate the REA’s enabling clause.82
The REA’s second clause—“the limiting clause”—states 
that no promulgated rule may “abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”
 
83 Thus, like the enabling clause, the limiting 
clause draws a distinction between substance and procedure.84
 
time ordain and establish.”). 
 
 76. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (vesting in Congress the power “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).  
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).  
 78. Id. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases 
in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate 
judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”). 
 79. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (“Neither 
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies dif-
ferent variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.”).  
 81. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 82. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1442 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  
 84. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act 
and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 35–42 (2008) (analyzing possible interpretations of the 
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To determine whether or not a rule is procedural or substantive 
under the limiting clause, a court will ask whether it “really 
regulates procedure[]—the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly admin-
istering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of 
them.”85 As some have noted, this test appears tautological, i.e., 
“a matter is procedural if, by revelation, it is procedural.”86 
However, the Court does not appear to struggle in its applica-
tion. Indeed, the Court has never found a Federal Rule to vio-
late either the enabling clause or the limiting clause.87
If a Federal Rule creates a vertical conflict of law, a court 
will ensure that the rule complies with both of the REA’s claus-
es. Clear as this test appears, the most recent Erie decision—
Shady Grove—demonstrates that there is considerable disa-
greement within the Court concerning how to apply multiple 
steps of the analysis.
 
88
B. SHADY GROVE 
 
Shady Grove was a class action to recover unpaid “statuto-
ry” interest accrued on overdue insurance claim payments that 
Allstate Insurance Company allegedly routinely refused to 
pay.89
 
REA implicated by its “procedural-substantive tension”). 
 The District Court dismissed the class action because 
under the New York procedural rules a class cannot recover a 
 85. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).  
 86. See, e.g., 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509 (3d ed. 2011). 
 87. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442, (observing that the Court has 
“rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule”).  
 88. This disagreement begins when determining whether state and feder-
al rules actually conflict. Compare id. at 1437–42 (holding that Rule 23 and 
the applicable state rule do conflict because they both address “whether a class 
action may proceed for a given suit” and criticizing the dissent’s approach to 
the question because it would produce “confusion worse confounded” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 1461–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the Court should avoid “immoderate interpretations of the Federal 
Rules that would trench on state prerogatives without serving any counter-
vailing federal interest” and that the majority “finds conflict where none is 
necessary”). The Court’s disagreement further extends to the importance of 
the state’s purposes in creating the rule. Compare id. at 1442–48 (arguing that 
the proper REA analysis “leaves no room for special exemptions based on the 
function or purpose of the state rule”), with id. at 1448–56 (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the Rule Enabling Act commands the Court to show 
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 89. Id. at 1436. 
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“penalty.”90 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that although 
Federal Rule 23 would permit the class action to proceed, the 
federal class action rule does not address the question of statu-
tory penalties and therefore did not actually conflict with the 
state law.91 Because the Second Circuit determined that New 
York’s prohibition of class recovery of penalties was substantive 
and not procedural, the state law applied in federal court under 
Erie and the REA.92 The Supreme Court overruled, holding that 
Rule 23 did address the question of statutory penalties because 
it allowed all class actions to proceed so long as the Rule’s re-
quirements are met.93 Further, the Court held that Rule 23 
does not violate the terms of the REA and therefore was valid 
and operated to displace New York’s rule in federal courts.94
Justice Scalia nicely articulated the point of contention be-
tween himself and Justice Stevens: “compliance of a federal 
rule with the Enabling Act is to be assessed by consulting the 
Rule itself, and not its effects in individual applications.”
 
Though a majority of Justices agreed that Rule 23 was valid 
and controlled the action before it, only a plurality agreed on 
how to determine the validity of federal rules against their con-
flicting state counterparts under the REA. 
95 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, the measure of a federal rule is simp-
ly whether or not it “really regulates procedure.”96 Federal rules 
are either valid or not;97
 
 90. Id. at 1437. 
 any REA analysis should focus on the 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1442 (“Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any 
federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites 
are met.”); see also id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that Rule 23 
squarely answers the question of class certification in federal courts; “[t]hat is 
the explicit function of Rule 23”). The Shady Grove dissent disagreed on this 
point. See id. at 1461–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
argued that the Court has consistently read federal rules narrowly to avoid 
conflict with state rules and since Rule 23 does not explicitly address the type 
of remedies available, it should similarly be read narrowly to avoid conflict 
with a state rule that limits the remedies available. See id.  
 94. Id. at 1443 (holding that Rule 23 is valid under the REA’s enabling 
clause, “at least insofar as it allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate 
claims against the same defendants in a class action”); see also id. at 1457 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that it is “hard to see how § 901(b) could be 
understood as a rule that, though procedural in form, serves the function of 
defining New York’s rights or remedies”).  
 95. Id. at 1444. 
 96. Id. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).  
 97. See id. at 1444 (arguing that “[a] Federal Rule of Procedure is not val-
id in some jurisdictions and invalid in others”). 
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content of the federal rule, without consideration of state rules 
or rights.98 If a federal rule “regulates procedure . . . it is au-
thorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect 
to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect on state-created 
rights.”99 Thus, the content of a state rule and whether it is 
“substantive” or “procedural” is irrelevant.100 Under the REA, 
therefore, a federal rule is invalid only if the alleged substan-
tive transgression occurs on the face of the rule itself.101 This is 
incredibly unlikely because, as the Court previously observed, a 
facially invalid rule implies that “the Advisory Committee, [the 
Supreme] Court, and Congress erred in” enacting the rule.102
Justice Stevens, by contrast, reads the REA as allowing for 
as-applied challenges to federal rules. He reads the limiting 
clause as reflecting Congress’s desire to respect each state’s 
“definition of its own rights or remedies,” and a federal rule 
which interferes with the scope of these rights or remedies is 
invalid.
  
103 Because a federal rule’s validity is measured by ref-
erence to the content of particular state rights, the REA per-
mits case-specific, as-applied challenges.104 Justice Stevens’s 
approach recognizes that although a state rule may take a pro-
cedural form,105 it nevertheless may be “so bound up with the 
state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that 
substantive right or remedy.”106
 
 98. See id. at 1442 (“What matters is what the rule itself regulates.”). 
 In such instances, the REA 
 99. Id. at 1444. 
 100. Id. (arguing that “it is not the substantive or procedural nature of 
purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or proce-
dural nature of the Federal Rule”).  
 101. See Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and 
Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2011) (arguing that Justice Scal-
ia’s focus on “[t]he word ‘itself’ signals, albeit faintly, a distinction between fa-
cial challenges (i.e., the rule itself) and as-applied challenges (i.e., the effect of 
applying the rule in a particular context)”).  
 102. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 103. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1449 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the REA’s substantive rights limitation “means only that federal rules 
cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights or remedies”). 
 104. See id. at 1449–50 (claiming that the REA analysis is “applied to di-
versity cases” and “requires careful interpretation of the state and federal pro-
visions at issue”). 
 105. See id. at 1450 (recognizing that states may choose “to use a tradition-
ally procedural vehicle as a means of defining the scope of substantive rights 
or remedies”). 
 106. Id. 
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does not authorize application of a federal rule which would 
modify state rights. 
While Justice Stevens would allow plaintiffs to bring as-
applied challenges to particular federal rules, Justice Scalia re-
jects this approach. Because only some states have rejected the 
plausibility standard, plaintiffs can only succeed in challenging 
the plausibility standard’s validity if courts permit them to 
bring as-applied challenges under the REA. 
C. THE REA AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES 
Although there is a well-established analytical framework 
in REA cases, the Shady Grove opinion revealed that there is 
substantial disagreement as to the scope and meaning of the 
REA’s substantive rights limitation. This Part compares and 
contrasts Justice Scalia’s and Justice Stevens’s interpretations 
of the REA and argues that Justice Stevens’s approach shows 
greater fidelity to both Supreme Court precedent and the REA’s 
text. 
1. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and As-Applied Challenges 
In Shady Grove, both Justice Scalia and Stevens discussed 
the Court’s interpretation of the REA in Sibbach v. Wilson & 
Co. While Justice Scalia reads Sibbach as barring any as-
applied test to the validity of a federal rule, Justice Stevens 
reads Sibbach as upholding Federal Rules 35 and 37 against a 
facial challenge, thereby leaving room for litigants to challenge 
the validity of a federal rule in specific applications.  
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., the petitioner had sought 
damages for injuries sustained within the state of Indiana.107 
Pursuant to Federal Rule 35, the federal district court, which 
sat in Illinois, ordered Sibbach to submit to physical examina-
tions to assess the injuries alleged.108 When Sibbach refused to 
comply, the Court found Sibbach guilty of contempt.109 At that 
time, the Illinois state courts did not permit such orders.110 
State courts in Indiana, however, followed the Federal Rule, 
and would have permitted a similar order.111
 
 107. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 4 (1941). 
 To avoid the sanc-
tions imposed, Sibbach argued that Rules 35 and 37 exceeded 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 6–7. 
 110. Id. at 7. 
 111. Id. 
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the rule-making power delegated by Congress through the 
REA.112
Sibbach, however, had brought an ill-fated appeal. If she 
succeeded in invalidating the Federal Rules, the RDA would 
dictate that Indiana law controlled, not Illinois law.
 
113 Thus, 
Sibbach would have been subject to compelled examination and 
potential sanctions whether or not her appeal succeeded. To 
avoid this result, Sibbach ignored the applicable state laws en-
tirely. Instead, she conceded that Rules 35 and 37 were proce-
dural, but insisted that they so intruded upon rights that gen-
erally were “important or substantial,” so as to violate the 
REA’s limiting clause.114 Thus, Sibbach urged the Court to in-
validate Rules 35 and 37 because the Rules themselves—
without any examination of conflicting state law—transgressed 
important substantive rights. In other words, Sibbach brought 
a facial challenge to Rules 35 and 37.115
The Court easily rejected Sibbach’s argument for the sim-
ple reason that Sibbach failed to identify any particular body of 
law that protected the supposedly important rights at issue. In 
the Court’s words, the rights Sibbach identified were 
“[r]ecognized where and by whom?”
  
116 Permitting a federal rule 
to be invalidated based on how important an unidentified right 
is would result in “confusion worse confounded”117 because in 
the absence of any applicable law there is no standard to de-
termine whether a rule is important enough to remain inviolate 
against federal rulemaking. In the absence of any particular 
substantive right that a federal rule supposedly violates, the 
REA’s limiting clause simply applies to the face of the federal 
rule in question and the only remaining standard to assess the 
rule’s validity is whether it “really regulates procedure.”118
 
 112. Id. at 7–8. 
 
 113. Id. at 10–11. 
 114. Id. at 11. 
 115. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 
1431, 1454 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that in Sibbach “[t]he pe-
titioner raised only the facial question whether ‘Rules 35 and 37 [of the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure] are . . . within the mandate of Congress to this 
Court’ and not the specific question of ‘the obligation of federal courts to apply 
the substantive law of a state’” (alteration in original)). 
 116. Id. at 13. 
 117. Id. at 14. 
 118. Id.; see also Ides, supra note 101, at 1057 (arguing that the “really 
regulates procedure” test should only be read as a “tag” on the Court’s rejec-
tion of Sibbach’s argument that important rights which are not recognized by 
any particular body of law can serve as the basis for an REA challenge). 
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Ignoring the fact that Sibbach involved a facial rather than 
an as-applied challenge, Justice Scalia reads Sibbach as reject-
ing any “test that turns on the idiosyncrasies of state law.”119 
Hence, he states that Justice Stevens’s approach to the REA 
would require overturning Sibbach.120
In fact, Justice Scalia agrees that exclusive focus on the 
federal rule is difficult to square with the REA’s limiting 
clause.
 This criticism is mis-
placed, however, because Sibbach did not hold that litigants 
could not bring as-applied challenges under the REA; there was 
no such challenge at issue. At most, Sibbach held that in order 
to implicate the REA’s limiting clause, a litigant must identify 
a substantive right recognized somewhere by someone that the 
federal rule in question allegedly transgresses. As-applied chal-
lenges satisfy Sibbach’s rule so long as they identify a particu-
lar state right that the federal rule in question transgresses.  
121 But, he goes on to argue, Congress never modified the 
REA in light of Sibbach’s holding.122 Moreover, allowing for as-
applied challenges would produce endless litigation over “hun-
dreds of hard questions” rather than the “single hard question” 
of a federal rule’s facial validity.123 But, as Justice Stevens 
pointed out, “[t]he question is what rule Congress estab-
lished,”124
2. Substance and Procedure in the REA 
 and as Sibbach suggests, that rule—the REA—
permits as-applied challenges.  
The meaning of “substance” and “procedure” in the REA is 
contentious125 and well beyond the scope of this Note. It is clear, 
however, that the statute expresses a particular relationship 
between the concepts; namely, a relationship that is not mutu-
ally exclusive. The REA’s enabling clause delegates to the 
Court the power to create rules that are “procedural.”126
 
 119. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1445. 
 The 
 120. Id. (“In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach, but to 
overrule it (or, what is the same, to rewrite it).”). 
 121. Id. at 1445–46 (“[I]t is hard to understand how it can be determined 
whether a federal rule ‘abridges’ or ‘modifies’ substantive rights without know-
ing what state-created rights would obtain if the federal rule did not exist.”).  
 122. See id. at 1446 (asserting that “Congress remains free to correct us 
. . . and adhering to our precedent allows it to do so” (citation omitted)). 
 123. Id. at 1447. 
 124. Id. at 1454. 
 125. See Redish & Murashko, supra 84, at 27 (“To this day, no real consen-
sus has developed as to how the Act should be interpreted.”). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power 
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limiting clause excludes from this power any rule that would 
transgress any substantive right.127 If the REA contemplated 
mutually exclusive spheres named “substance” and “proce-
dure,” the limiting clause would be redundant.128
Justice Scalia’s reading of the REA applies mutually exclu-
sive conceptions of “substance” and “procedure” against the 
REA. “[T]he validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon 
whether it regulates procedure. If it does, it is authorized by 
§ 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions . . . .”
 In other 
words, the power to promulgate rules of procedure would, by 
definition, not include the power to promulgate substantive 
rules. Unless one is willing to accept an expressly redundant 
statute, the REA must be read as permitting the promulgation 
of a certain set of rules collectively named “procedure,” that 
nevertheless have the potential to modify a certain set of rights 
which the statute calls “substantive.” 
129 However, as Pro-
fessor John Hart Ely observed, any determination of a federal 
rule’s validity derived solely from classifying it as substantive 
or procedural “collapses” the two REA requirements into one.130 
By treating rules that fit within the scope of the statute’s ena-
bling clause as necessarily incapable of violating its limiting 
clause, Justice Scalia renders the latter toothless and construes 
it “as nothing more than a restatement of the first.”131
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, fashions a test that 
gives full effect to both clauses. Where an ostensibly procedural 
federal rule is “intimately bound up in the scope of a substan-
tive right or remedy,” it is not authorized by the REA.
 
132
 
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United 
States district courts . . . and courts of appeals.” (emphasis added)). 
 At the 
same time, Justice Stevens does not allow this limitation to 
 127. Id. § 2072(b) (2006) (“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.” (emphasis added)).  
 128. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 28 (arguing that under “the 
notion of mutual exclusivity of procedure and substance . . . the [REA’s] second 
provision effectively serves solely to place emphasis on the first”). 
 129. Shady Grove, 103 S. Ct. at 1444 (citations omitted). 
 130. Ely, supra note 68, at 719 (arguing that under Sibbach “the Act’s two 
questions were collapsed into one”). Like Justice Scalia, Professor Ely misread 
Sibbach as rejecting as-applied challenges of federal rules. However, unlike 
Justice Scalia, Professor Ely does not advocate this position. See id. at 722 (ar-
guing that if Sibbach’s “wholesale defeat of the Enabling Act is to be avoided, 
[the statute’s] interpretation must be geared . . . to the character of the state 
provision that enforcement of the Federal Rule in question will supplant”). 
 131. Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 28. 
 132. Shady Grove, 103 S. Ct. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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swallow the enabling clause. A federal rule is only invalid if 
there is “little doubt” that its application will actually alter the 
scope of state rights.133
III.  OBJECTING TO THE PLAUSIBILTY STANDARD IN 
FEDERAL COURTS   
 In this way, Justice Stevens gives full 
effect to both the REA’s clauses and, therefore, presents a more 
accurate reading of the statute. 
Justice Stevens’s approach to determining the validity of a 
Federal Rule requires examining the conflicted state rule and 
any substantive policies or rights that it may engender or 
transgress. His concurrence does not, however, clarify when 
exactly a state procedural rule should be considered sufficiently 
interwoven with substantive law to render its displacement a 
violation of the REA. This Part demonstrates that the state 
pleading standards examined in certain state courts are suffi-
ciently substantive to limit the plausibility standard’s applica-
bility. This Part then responds to likely objections to this con-
clusion, specifically that varied pleading standards undermine 
the goals of procedural uniformity and litigation on the merits 
of each case in federal courts. Lastly, this Part explains how 
applying such substantive state pleading standards in diversity 
cases resolves a troubling forum shopping problem raised by 
vertically disuniform pleading standards.  
A. PLEADING “BOUND UP WITH” SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
As argued above, there is an as-applied violation of the 
REA where application of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
serves to “define the scope of the state-created right.”134 Accord-
ing to Justice Stevens, this determination should be made with 
“sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory poli-
cies.”135 Significantly, he clarifies that “[s]uch laws . . . may be 
seemingly procedural rules that make it significantly more dif-
ficult to bring . . . a claim.”136
 
 133. Id. at 1457. 
 Thus, a heightened pleading 
standard appears to be precisely the type of rule that Justice 
Stevens thinks could be vulnerable to an as-applied challenge. 
This Part argues that no matter how one defines the word 
“substantive,” application of a federal pleading standard which 
 134. Id. at 1452. 
 135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Id. at 1450 (emphasis added). 
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is higher than its state counterpart in a diversity case violates 
the REA’s limiting clause. 
According to some broad definitions of “substance,” plead-
ing standards that engender particular state policies would 
constitute “substantive rights.” For example, one very broad 
definition of “substantive” proposes to encompass rights whose 
application would evoke “organized political attention of a 
group of litigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably) 
claim to be specially and adversely affected by the rule.”137 
Thus, a state court’s decision to apply a lower pleading stand-
ard in order to provide sufficient courthouse access to a class of 
potential plaintiffs138
Another slightly narrower definition of substantive rights 
reaches a similar conclusion. Professor Ely, for example, de-
fined substantive rights as those recognized “for some purpose 
or purposes not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of 
the litigation process.”
 can be read as recognizing a substantive 
right. 
139 Thus, a state which chooses to apply a 
lower pleading standard in order to protect the expectations 
and affairs of its local citizens140
Other, more restrictive definitions, however, may initially 
appear to exclude such engendered policies from the definition 
 can also be thought of as rec-
ognizing a substantive right. Under both of these broad defini-
tions of “substantive rights,” application of the plausibility 
standard would violate the terms of the REA’s limiting clause 
because it would directly constrict a substantive right that the 
state pleading rule engenders. 
 
 137. Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Ena-
bling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (1989) (describing Walter Wheeler Cook’s 
definition of substance and procedure). 
 138. See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 
422, 434 (Tenn. 2011) (citing concern over “information asymmetry” inherent 
to certain types of claims, “including actions for violations of civil rights, em-
ployment discrimination, antitrust, and conspiracy”); McCurry v. Chevy Chase 
Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 863 (Wash. 2010) (emphasizing access to the court 
“particularly in cases where evidence is almost exclusively in the possession of 
defendants”); Roth v. DeFeliceCare, Inc., 700 S.E.2d 183, 196–97 (W. Va. 2010) 
(Benjamin, J., dissenting) (worrying about the plausibility standard’s impact 
on pro se litigants); Syed v. Mobil Oil Mariana Islands, Inc., No. 090467, 2012 
WL 6738436, at *4 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 31, 2012) (concluding that to adopt a 
heightened pleading standard “would prematurely close the doors of justice on 
plaintiffs”). 
 139. Ely, supra note 68, at 725 (emphasis added). 
 140. See Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 431 (emphasizing stable procedural rules be-
cause “[s]tability in the law allows individuals to plan their affairs and to safe-
ly judge of their legal rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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of “substantive rights.” One could imagine, for example, a defi-
nition of substantive rights limited only to those laws that cre-
ate a cause of action. Or, less narrowly, rules that have a great-
er than incidental impact on activities “beyond the courthouse 
walls.”141
However, even under these more narrow definitions of sub-
stantive rights, the determination of a complaint’s plausibility 
represents, in some cases, a transgression of other rights that 
are substantive. As numerous state courts have worried, appli-
cation of judicial experience and common sense, as required by 
the plausibility standard, risks dismissing a legally sufficient 
complaint simply because the judge does not believe it reaches 
a threshold level of plausibility, or because there are more 
plausible explanations for the alleged misconduct.
 Under such definitions, a state that applies a particu-
lar pleading standard for the purposes of an open courthouse or 
to protect a particular class of litigants is unlikely to be consid-
ered as recognizing substantive rights. 
142 Even 
where a complaint’s factual content, taken as true, satisfies the 
elements of a cause of action and would therefore proceed in 
state court, there remains the potential for dismissal in federal 
court.143
 
 141. See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the 
Rules Enabling Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional 
and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1333 (2006) (describing 
the narrowest of three possible constructions of the REA). 
 In such instances, the federal pleading standard nar-
rows the availability of a state-created substantive right or 
cause of action. Thus, although Rule 8(a)(2) may be a classically 
 142. See Hawkeye Foodservice Distrib., Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 
N.W.2d 600, 609 (Iowa 2012) (“The only issue when considering a motion to 
dismiss is the petitioner’s right of access to the district court, not the merits of 
his allegations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 437 
(concluding that the pleading practice in Tennessee is “particularly ill-suited 
for an evaluation of the likelihood of success on the merits or of the weight of 
the facts pleaded”); McCurry, 233 P.3d at 863 (“The new Fed.R.Civ.P. [sic] 
12(b)(6) standard effectively reads ‘plausible’ into the rule, as follows: ‘failure 
to state a [plausible] claim upon which relief can be granted.’ This adds a de-
termination of the likelihood of success on the merits, so that a trial judge can 
dismiss a claim, even where the law does provide a remedy for the conduct al-
leged by the plaintiff, if that judge does not believe it is plausible the claim 
will ultimately succeed.” (alteration in original)); Roth, 700 S.E.2d at 197 (Ben-
jamin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plausibility standard “seem[s] to re-
quire a judge to make a value determination on the likelihood of whether a 
claim will ultimately succeed or not”). 
 143. See Miller, supra note 14, at 29 (arguing that “[i]f unconstrained, [ap-
plication of the plausibility standard] allows judges to deny access to a merits 
adjudication whenever an equivocal set of facts can be interpreted as ‘more 
likely’ to reflect lawful conduct”). 
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procedural rule and may not itself be substantive, its applica-
tion through the plausibility standard clearly serves to define 
the “scope” of other substantive rights at issue in certain diver-
sity cases and, therefore, violates the REA’s limiting clause. 
One of the likely unforeseen consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s development of the plausibility standard is that it has 
caused state courts to similarly reassess the process by which 
they determine the sufficiency of a complaint. These state 
courts have clarified the policies and rights implicated by local 
pleading rules. The courts in Tennessee and Washington in 
particular made clear that despite this inability to access cer-
tain “facts” which would otherwise be included in a complaint, 
the pleading standard should not operate to prevent these 
plaintiffs from pursuing their substantive rights in local 
courts.144
Application of the federal standard in states emphasizing 
these values is contrary to the REA’s limiting clause. As inter-
preted by the highest courts in these states, the local pleading 
standard serves the policy of broad protection of the substan-
tive law and therefore operates to determine the scope of states’ 
substantive rights and remedies. By effectively making it more 
difficult for particular types of cases to be brought by particular 
types of plaintiffs,
 In order to ensure broad court access for such plain-
tiffs, these courts retained a more liberal pleading standard 
than the federal plausibility standard. In this sense, these opin-
ions express the judgment that pursuit of substantive rights 
should be available to all litigants, even those who cannot im-
mediately plead particular types of facts. 
145
 
 144. See Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 434 (worrying that the plausibility standard 
would result in a “disproportionate dismissal” of claims where there is an “in-
formation asymmetry” between the plaintiff and defendant); McCurry, 233 
P.3d at 863 (questioning whether curbing discovery costs warrants decreasing 
court access, “particularly in cases where evidence is almost exclusively in the 
possession of defendants”). 
 application of the plausibility standard ra-
ther than the local standard would narrow the scope of the sub-
stantive law because it may entirely prevent certain types of 
claims from proceeding. 
 145. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 
459 (2008) (arguing that “plaintiffs may find that claims for which intent or 
state of mind is an element—such as discrimination or conspiracy claims—are 
more difficult to plead in a way that will satisfy the plausibility standard”). 
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B. PROCEDURAL VALUES AGAINST THE REA’S TEXT  
The strongest objection to applying state pleading stand-
ards in a diversity action is that this would undermine the val-
ue of procedural uniformity across district courts and across 
types of claims within a particular district. As Justice Scalia 
stated in Shady Grove, “[a] procedural rule is not valid in some 
jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some cases and 
invalid in others . . . .”146 This objection emphasizes that one of 
the original purposes of the Federal Rules and the REA was to 
establish uniform procedural practices and standards.147 As the 
argument goes, applying state pleading standards in a federal 
court undermines this goal because district courts sitting in 
states such as Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia 
would apply a different standard than district courts sitting in 
states such as Massachusetts.148 Moreover, within those dis-
tricts, there would be internal or “transsubstantive” 
disuniformity between diversity cases—where the state stand-
ard would apply—and non-diversity cases, where the federal 
standard would remain in effect.149
A second, more practical objection arises from the collat-
eral effects of disuniform pleading standards: invalidating the 
plausibility standard in a particular application opens the door 
to costly and complex Erie disputes over the validity of other 
federal rules. Invalidating a single procedural rule would cause 
litigants to question the validity of many other rules and would 
require courts to reconsider the substantive or procedural na-
ture of “countless state rules.”
 
150
 
 146. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1444 (2010). 
 Invalidating particular appli-
cations the federal pleading standard would not only increase 
federal litigation, it would weigh courts down in the complex 
procedure-substance debate which has traditionally been trou-
blesome. Lastly, such disputes detract from determining the 
 147. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1015, 1040–42 (1982) (describing the earlier Conformity Act’s failure 
to achieve a uniform procedure). 
 148. Compare, e.g., McCurry, 233 P.3d at 864 (refusing to adopt the plausi-
bility standard), with Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 
(Mass. 2008) (adopting Twombly’s “refinement” of Conley). 
 149. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of ‘General 
Rules,’ 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536 (2009) (arguing that “the ‘general rules’ re-
quired by the 1934 Rules Enabling Act should not only be uniformly applicable 
in all federal district courts, but uniformly applicable in all types of cases 
(transsubstantive)”). 
 150. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447. 
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merits of a case which, like procedural uniformity, is a central 
tenet of the Federal Rules.151
The response to these objections is two-fold. First, as Jus-
tice Stevens succinctly explained, “that inquiry is what the En-
abling Act requires.”
  
152 In terms of procedural uniformity, the 
REA states that no federal rule may modify “any substantive 
right.”153
Second, the ad hoc nature of determining the validity of 
federal rules under as-applied challenges is a more effective 
way to ensure compliance with the REA’s limiting clause. To be 
prescribed, a proposed federal rule endures multiple stages of 
revision and recommendation in successive committees.
 Thus, if a duly enacted federal rule would serve to 
modify any substantive right, the REA’s limiting clause does 
not authorize displacement of the state law. Similarly, the con-
cern for avoiding complex Erie disputes is misplaced because 
the substance-procedure determination is required by the 
REA’s text, which limits the power to create procedural rules to 
the extent they do not have substantive effects. Thus, if there is 
a legitimate question regarding the substantive nature of a 
particular displaced state right, the REA requires a resolution, 
regardless of how much litigation it encourages or how complex 
that question is.  
154 This 
process requires that the public155 and “interested parties”156 
have notice and an opportunity to comment. No matter how 
thorough such a vetting process may be, it is impractical and 
unwise to require or presume that the public, experts, and 
committees are capable of evaluating a proposed rule’s substan-
tive effect in every conceivable instance.157
 
 151. See Burbank, supra note 
 Even the most thor-
ough examination of a proposed rule’s effect will inevitably 
leave some contexts unexamined. After all, as the Court has 
147, at 1066–67 (reporting that prior to the 
REA’s enactment, the ABA emphasized that procedural rules should pursue 
litigation on the merits of each case). 
 152. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1454 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 154. See generally Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal 
Civil Rulemaking Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules 
Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 337–38 (2011) (de-
scribing the rules enactment process); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2074.  
 155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073(c)(1). 
 156. Id. § 2073(c)(2).  
 157. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 84, at 94 (arguing that the Feder-
al Rules should not be presumed valid because the process of enacting a rule 
“comes without a formalized and careful adversary presentation of all sides of 
the issue of the rule’s validity”). 
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repeatedly observed, the substantive or procedural nature of a 
particular law varies across contexts.158
More fundamentally, the determination of a rule’s validity 
only reflects existing law at the time of that assessment. As-
suming that the substantive effects of a rule could be exhausted 
during the proposal process, the rule’s validity would be limited 
to a static composition of the legal landscape.
 Litigation over such 
questions shines light on contexts which were not addressed 
during the rule’s proposal period. In this way, allowing litigants 
to bring as-applied challenges supplements the process by 
which federal rules were originally enacted and helps ensure 
their validity. 
159 It is difficult to 
explain how a federal rule’s substantive effects remain frozen 
while the landscape against which those effects were originally 
measured is fluid. In the pleading context, for example, not on-
ly has the Supreme Court introduced a new way of thinking 
about pleading,160
C. LIMITING EGREGIOUS FORUM-SHOPPING 
 but states are re-assessing their own stand-
ards, which may lead to substantive modifications. Thus, the 
only way to ensure that the application of the plausibility 
standard in federal courts does not have substantive effects is 
to measure the rule’s continuing validity against emerging le-
gal contexts.  
One major advantage to applying state pleading rules in 
certain diversity cases is that it resolves a major issue in the 
context of the federal court’s removal jurisdiction. When a 
plaintiff files an action in state court, but a federal court would 
have also been an appropriate forum, a defendant may remove 
the action to the federal court161
 
 158. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (”Neither 
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies dif-
ferent variables upon the particular problem for which it is used.”). 
 without the consent of either 
 159. See Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformi-
ty, and as-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1181, 1209 (2011) (observing that changes in the legal context may re-
sult in “a given procedural practice acquir[ing] a substantive rights valence 
that it previously lacked”). 
 160. Compare Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (ob-
serving that notice pleading “relies on liberal discovery rules and summary 
judgment to . . . to dispose of unmeritorious claims”), with Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (stating that “[i]t is no answer to say that a 
claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can . . . be weeded out early 
in the discovery process”). 
 161. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
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the state court or the plaintiff.162 Removal has significant pro-
cedural effect because once in federal court, the Federal Rules 
displace the applicable state rules which previously controlled 
the course of the litigation.163 Once an action is removed, the 
federal court may even unwind orders that the state court 
handed down prior to removal on the basis that there is a sub-
stantial difference between the applicable state and federal 
procedural standards.164
The federal court’s removal jurisdiction, therefore, allows a 
diverse defendant to avoid a more lenient state pleading stand-
ard and avail himself of the federal plausibility standard.
 
165 Ex-
acerbating this power to avoid state pleading standards is the 
district court’s aforementioned power to unwind state court or-
ders.166
 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (“[A]ny civil 
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, 
to the district court of the United States for the district and division embrac-
ing the place where such action is pending.”).  
 Assuming a defendant complies with all the applicable 
timing and filing requirements, this allows diverse defendants 
to take a “wait-and-see” approach to forum selection based on 
the outcome of a motion to dismiss. A defendant may file the 
motion in state court, promptly remove the action if the motion 
is denied, and subsequently refile the same motion in federal 
court under the more strict plausibility standard. Courts have 
upheld this approach to forum selection in the summary judg-
 162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdic-
tion and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 
(stating that removal is effected and that the “State court shall proceed no fur-
ther unless and until the case is remanded” once the defendant gives notice of 
the removal to the state court and all adverse parties).  
 163. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1) (“These rules apply to a civil action after it is 
removed from a state court.”). 
 164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (2006) (“All injunctions orders, and other pro-
ceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and 
effect until dissolved or modified by the district court.” (emphasis added)); see 
also 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3738 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that “[o]rders or rulings issued 
by the state court prior to removal are not conclusive in the federal action af-
ter removal” and that “[a] federal court has particularly good reason to recon-
sider a state court determination where federal standards differ from state 
law standards on an issue”). 
 165. See Maness v. Bos. Scientific, 751 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (E.D. Tenn. 
2010) (granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
and applying the federal plausibility standard instead of Tennessee’s notice 
pleading standard). 
 166. See supra note 164.  
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ment context167
Applying less restrictive pleading standards in federal 
courts would alleviate this problem without undermining the 
purpose of removal jurisdiction. Defendants would still be able 
to access the federal forum through removal jurisdiction, there-
by avoiding any local bias inherent to the state court.
 and there is no reason to think that the proce-
dure would not be permitted with respect to pleading. This 
wait-and-see approach is problematic because it undermines 
the authority and finality of the state court’s judgment by per-
mitting defendants to remove an action and refile their motion 
to dismiss simply because they do not like the state court’s de-
cision. 
168
  CONCLUSION   
 Howev-
er, defendants would not be able to evade the state court’s 
pleading standard—or any previous state court pleading judg-
ments—by doing so. 
The Erie doctrine and pleading standards are notoriously 
murky areas of civil procedure. Attorneys who have attempted 
to wade through these waters have harmed their clients’ inter-
ests by failing to grasp how these doctrines interact.169
 
 167. See Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by grant-
ing the defendant’s post-removal motion for summary judgment because the 
federal and state standards were sufficiently different). 
 In re-
 168. One of the major purposes of removal jurisdiction is to ensure that de-
fendants are not subject to a state court which may be hostile to a diverse par-
ty’s interests. See generally 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2011) (“Like the diversity 
of citizenship and alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts, the original right 
to remove probably was designed to protect nonresidents from the local preju-
dices of state courts.”). 
 169. Inexplicably, attorneys who have attempted to challenge the plausibil-
ity standard under the Erie doctrine have severely misapplied the law. In two 
recent appellate briefs, attorneys have cited the near-dead “outcome determi-
native” test to argue that Erie instructs federal courts to apply a state plead-
ing standard. See Brief for Appellant at *19–25, Christiansen v. W. Branch 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., No. 11-1904, 2011 WL 2679065 (8th Cir. June 28, 2011) (cit-
ing Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) and arguing that “the 
choice of pleading standard in Appellant’s case is outcome determinative”); 
Brief for Appellants at *10–11, G&S Holdings LLC v. Cont. Cas. Co., No. 11-
1813, 2011 WL 4542825 (7th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011) (arguing the same). The at-
torneys signing these briefs, however, succumbed to the very “fundamental 
flaw” that the Supreme Court highlighted almost fifty years ago in Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–70 (1965). Not only did the Hanna court abrogate 
Erie’s old “outcome determinative test,” id. at 466–67 (“‘Outcome-
determination’ analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman.”), it also 
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sponse, federal courts have dismissed Erie challenges to the 
plausibility standard without due consideration.170
Fortunately, recent developments in state court pleading 
standards and the Supreme Court’s Erie doctrine jurisprudence 
provide an avenue for successfully challenging the plausibility 
standard. Although pleading standards are quintessential pro-
cedural rules, they nevertheless serve to define the scope of cer-
tain substantive rights. Because the plausibility standard has 
the collateral effect of narrowing the reach of such rights, it vio-
lates the REA’s limiting clause and, therefore, is not authorized 
to displace more lenient state pleading standards.  
 In order to 
give plaintiffs’ complaints the best chance at surviving a motion 
to dismiss, attorneys must do a better job at understanding the 
law and thereby giving hurried courts reason to pause. 
 
 
held that Erie—whose progeny included the outcome determinative test—did 
not direct the Court’s analysis where there was a controlling federal rule of 
procedure, id. at 466–67, 473 (“[I]t cannot be forgotten that the Erie rule, and 
the guidelines suggested in York, were created to serve another purpose alto-
gether.”). Instead, where there is a controlling rule of federal procedure, courts 
simply ask whether that rule is a valid exercise of the power to promulgate 
procedural rules under the REA. 
 170. See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 938–39 
(8th Cir. 2012) (stating without analysis that complaints in cases removed to 
federal court are “governed by the current federal pleading standard”). 
